Archa Verbi, I (2005), 23–39
The origins of the Trinitarian attributes potentia, sapientia, benignitas1
by Matthias Perkams
One major theme in 12th-century theological literature is the discussion about
the extent to which the Trinity can be understood by human reason. A crucial
point is the explanation of the Trinity with the help of an image taken from
the perfection of God’s activity as creator of the world. This had a vast influence on the medieval discussion of Trinitarian theology: the three persons of
the Trinity are compared to God’s omnipotence, wisdom and benignity or
goodness respectively (potentia, sapientia, benignitas or bonitas in the most usual
terminology2). This triad of concepts can be traced back to Middle Platonic
philosophical discussions and was first used in a Christian context by Irenaeus
of Lyon, who quotes it as δυ ναµις, σοϕι α, αÆ γαθοτηÄ ς3. It is, however, a difficult
question, by what route the formula found its way to the medieval discussions
about the Trinity: the three concepts cannot be derived directly from Irenaeus, because in the Latin translation of his work they are rendered as virtus,
sapientia, bonitas. They are not found either, as one triad, in Augustine’s Trinitarian theology, which was the main source for the medieval discussion on this
topic. It is hard to explain, then, why the triad appears, in the form potentia,
sapientia, benignitas, around 1120 in the works of two leading theologians of
this time: in Peter Abelard’s Theologia ‘Summi Boni’ and in Hugh of Saint
Victor’s De tribus diebus.4 Because neither of these contemporaries cites the
other, it is not clear who was the first to introduce potentia, sapientia, benignitas
in the Trinitarian context in which it became so important in the later tradition.
In a major study on Hugh of Saint Victor’s De tribus diebus and its sources,
Dominique Poirel could throw some light on the history of the formula. He
shows that Hugh of Saint Victor could have knowledge of the triad through
Ambrose’s Expositio in Hexaemeron and from the De fide, spe et caritate by the
1
2
3
4
This paper is the fruit of discussions after a speech of the 11th International Conference
for Medieval Philosophy at Porto in August 2002. I thank Constant Mews for reading
previous versions of it and preventing me from many errors in the content and, last but
not least, in my English. For further corrections of my English I thank Morwenna
Ludlow.
On the variable terminology of Hugh cf. Poirel 2002, pp. 327–343; Abelard is generally
more consistent, but he can also use caritas instead of bonitas or benignitas regarding the
Holy Spirit, e.g. Tsum 1, 17, p. 92, 160f.
Irenaeus Adversus haereses 4,38, 3; Whittaker 1987, pp. 282–287.
Tsum 1, 1–5, p. 86–88; Hugo trib. dieb. 1, pp. 4–6; with explicit regard to the Trinity: ibid.
25, p. 64, 1131f.; 27, pp. 69f.
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Matthias Perkams
9th-century abbot Paschasius Radbertus,5 a work which was apparently not
widely read in the 12th century.6
Paschasius was obviously the first medieval Theologian to use potentia, sapientia, voluntas as a triad of nouns, not of adjectives. Poirel concludes from this
that Hugh, contrary to the most current opinion on this issue, did not have to
rely on Abelard to re-introduce this formula into Trinitarian theology. Therefore he holds that “c’est très probablement Hugues qui fut la source d’Abélard et non l’inverse”7. By this he gets a new terminus ante quem for the De tribus
diebus at around 1120, when Abelard’s Theologia ‘Summi Boni’ was published.
While it is surely true that Hugh might have known the triad from the
sources mentioned by Poirel, it does not necessarily follow from this that he,
and not Abelard, was the first to apply the formula to the Trinity. Indeed,
there are some arguments in favor of establishing Abelard in this regard. In
the first part of my paper, I shall explain, how he could have coined the
formula, relying on earlier discussions in Paris and Laon, but without presupposing Hugh’s treatise. Indeed, it is indicated by some points of contact between the De tribus diebus and the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’, which I shall discuss in
the second part, that more probably Hugh was relying on Abelard than the
other way around. In a third part, I shall discuss Poirel’s arguments for claiming that Hugh was the first to apply the formula to the Trinity.
1. Abelard and the contemporary discussions
At the time of Abelard and Hugh, the discussion about the Trinity was already
going on for some decades in the schools of Paris, Laon and other cities.
Within the texts which inform us about the ideas developed here, there are
some passages that show elements of the application of potentia, sapientia, benignitas to the Trinity. These texts are products of the schools where Abelard was
educated8. We can safely assume that he knew the discussions and arguments
which we find within them, even if we cannot say for sure that he knew exactly
these texts or that they are, in their present form, anterior to the Theologia
‘Summi Boni’. But, as I want to demonstrate more clearly, his own Trinitarian
teaching, based on the use of the triadic formula in a Trinitarian context, can
easily be understood as a reaction to the opinions attested here.
The first text which is relevant here is attributed to William of Champeaux
in the Liber pancrisis, an anthology of theological teachings from the early
twelfth century, which brings together opinions of the Church Fathers and of
some contemporary masters. William, who had been Abelard’s teacher for
some years, is reported as describing sapientia as the Son (a traditional Pauline
concept) and caritas as the Holy Spirit (a traditional Augustinian concept),
5
6
7
8
Poirel 2002, pp. 163–165.
Poirel 2002, pp. 351–356.
Poirel 2002, p. 376.
Both are cited by Poirel, but not linked with Abelard; cf. already the critical apparatus to
Tsum 1, 1.
The origins of the Trinitarian attributes potentia, sapientia, benignitas
25
whereas he mentions potentia in connection with the divine substance, but
without linking it explicitly with the Father:
One has to hold firmly that the simple substance of the godness is totally free from all
forms or parts. Because of its dignity and its potency it is necessary to believe much
about it which cannot be grasped by human reason. … Also the catholic church
judges that one shall not hear those who say that some creatures have been existed all
the time along with the Creator, like the sun who by its nature is prior to its light, but
in no time is without its light … so they say that also the Creator does not exist in any
time without some effects of himself. … For he created … everything from
nothing … by his wisdom and loved it by his charity. This wisdom is called the Son of
the Father, and the charity the Holy Spirit of both of them.9
By contrast with Abelard and Hugh, potentia is not used here as an attribute
of the father,10 but as an attribute of the divine substance. It is, however, only a
little step to the complete Trinitarian formula, if someone is looking out for a
suitable attribute of the father.11 William stresses that the divine substance and
the Trinity cannot be understood by human reason because it transcends its
categories; consequently, they are objects of the real faith which believes what
is not visible. In spite of that, William thinks that a rational explanation of the
Trinity is possible with the help of analogies (similitudines),12 the same method,
which Abelard uses extensively in the different versions of his Theologia.13 So
we have good reasons to assume that he knew this teaching of William.
The same holds true for the second text I want to hint at which has especially close links to Abelard’s theology. This text, the Sententiae divinae paginae
(from now on SDP) is a collection of Sentences whose exact date is difficult to
determine. The editor F. P. Bliemetzrieder suspects it to be a work of Anselm
9
10
11
12
13
“Illud tamen firmiter est tenendum, illam simplicem divinitatis substantiam omnium tam
formarum quam partium omnino esse expertum. De qua propter dignitatem ipsius et
potentiam multa credi oportet que capi ratione non possunt humana. … Nec enim
catholica ecclesia illos iudicat audiendos, qui aliquas ex creaturis dicunt semper cum
creatore fuisse ac sicut sol, qui natura prior est suo lumine, nunquam tamen est sine suo
lumine … sic et ipsum creatorem, potentia et dignitate priorem, nunquam tamen sine
aliquo suo dicunt exstitisse effectu. … Ipse enim … omnia de nihilo … sua sapientia
creavit et sua caritate dilexit. Que quidem sapientia Filius Patris, caritas vero Spiritus
utriusque sanctus nominatur.“ (Guillelmus Sententiae, nr. 236, pp. 191, 58–192, 85).
Poirel 2002, pp. 363–366.
Cf. also the text cited by Poirel 2002, p. 367, whose date is, however, difficult to establish.
“Est enim unus Deus et trinus, unus quidem in substantia, trinus in personis; quod
qualiter explicare possim non video, quoniam in nulla rerum natura simile quod possit
inveniri. Dici tamen et credi oportet Deum unum tres habere personas quarum una
Pater dicitur, propterea quod ex se credatur aliam generare personam que Filius nominatur. De qua generatione per similitudinem id dicamus quod possumus; et quod similitudo describere non poterit fides sola defendat.“ (Guillelmus Campellensis Sententiae,
p. 192, 85–92).
Cf. Tsum, Capitula librorum 3; 2, 65; 3, 52, p. 85, 14f.; p. 135, 572f.; p. 179, 623f., and
elsewhere.
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Matthias Perkams
of Laon,14 but it is more probably a product of his school or a collection of
notes taken from his lectures.15 The structure of the text shows remarkable
parallels to William’s Sententiae:16 it contains discussion of the Trinity immediately after an opening chapter which deals at some length with the divine
essence and its incomprehensibility by human reason, yet then goes on to give
rational arguments about identity and difference. This structural parallel is
interesting because it is not found in the other Sentence collections of the
School of Laon with the one exception of the Sententiae Atrebatenses which cite
extensively the SDP, but without mentioning the Trinitarian attributes:17 the so
called Sententiae Anselmi discuss the divine substance and the Trinity very
shortly while they are otherwise much longer than the SDP;18 the De conditione
angelica et humana does not contain a theological discussion at all;19 the Sententiae Berolinenses open with a long chapter on the Trinity, but without a preceding part on the divine essence and without mentioning the Trinitarian
attributes.20. If we find at all a discussion of the Trinitarian attributes in one of
these collections, we find it in the section concerning the creation of man, and
the argument is quite Augustinian without touching the new developments
discussed in the present article.21 So both the structure of William’s Sentences
and the SDP and the mention of the Trinitarian attributes in both texts hint at
a certain relationship of them. On the other hand, as regards the content, the
doctrine of the SDP is quite different from William’s teaching. This is clearly
shown by the following extract, which directly concerns our question:
The cognition of this Trinity seems to be materially within the human reason.
Because, when the human reason regards that all these changeable things have taken
and have got a beginning from something, it regards in this moment the person of the
Father from whom everything is. But when it recognizes that everything has been
made in wisdom, it attends then the person of the Son, that is the wisdom of the
Father. And when it recognizes that everything has been made in goodness, there is
the Holy Spirit, that is the goodness of God the Father.22
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Bliemetzrieder 1919, p. 31*f.
On the possibility of notes taken from systematic lectures at this period cf. Lefèvre 1959,
p. 254f.
Also Constant Mews sees a close relationship of both texts in the sixth chapter of his
forthcoming book on Peter Abelard; I thank him for sending me a draft of this chapter.
Sententiae Atrebatenses 1, pp. 206f.
Sententiae Anselmi 1, pp. 47f.
Liber de conditione, p. 256.
Sententiae Berolinenses, pp. 39, 1–40, 40.
E.g. Sententiae Berolinenses, p. 47, 1–8; Sententiae Atrebatenses 5, pp. 213, 19–214, 32.
“Cognitio etiam istius trinitatis materialiter videtur insita humane rationi. Cum enim
humana ratio attendit omnia hec mutabilia cepisse et habuisse exordium ab aliquo,
ibidem attendit patris personam, a quo omnia. Cum autem omnia in sapientia facta esse
dinoscit, ibi personam filii, quod est sapientia patris. Cum vero omnia in bonitate facta
dinoscit, ibi spiritus sanctus, quod est bonitas Dei patris”. (Sententiae Divinae Paginae 3,
pp. 7–8).
The origins of the Trinitarian attributes potentia, sapientia, benignitas
27
The author of these Sentences is obviously less critical as regards an understanding of the Trinity by human reason than William of Champeaux. One
could read both texts as directly opposed to each other in this regard, but
perhaps it is better to see both of them as representative of one tradition
within which they present a more or less rational standpoint. Anyway, the SDP
speaks more openly about the use of reason in Trinitarian debate than Abelard who, like William, does not claim that the Trinity can be grasped directly
by human reason, but recurs to similitudines for its explanation. But in spite of
that, there are certain affinities between the argument of the SDP and the
beginning of Abelard’s Theologia ‘Summi Boni’: in both texts the Trinity is
explained by a triad of concepts which are assumed to be necessary to a
perfect creator.
The SDP argues from basic assumptions about creation to the nature of the
Creator: creation is created, so there has to be a Creator; it is created wisely, so
this Creator has to be wise; it is created well, so he has to be good. These
conclusions are supposed to give human reason an understanding of the
divine Trinity. The creator who, as the divine substance, has in William’s Sentences the attribute of potentia, is identified in the SDP as the first person of the
Trinity.
It is easy to see that the argument of the SDP was open to criticisms from
theologians which were more critical about the use of reason in Trinitarian
theology. On the other hand, the idea of explaining the doctrine of the
Trinity rationally could have seemed to those theologians with an interest in
logic more attractive than the rather restrictive approach of William of Champeaux. Such a theologian was Peter Abelard: he was taught by William of
Champeaux with whom he had deep disagreements.23 He also studied with
Roscelin of Compiègne whose Trinitarian theology we do not know very
exactly, but who was interested in this topic and who put forward a theory
obviously very different from William’s.24 And Abelard studied with Anselm of
Laon whose school could have been the place where the SDP has been produced.25 So it is quite probable that Abelard knew also the terminology and
the opinions attested by this collection of sentences. If he intended to explain
the doctrine of Trinity from the point of view of a logician, as he in fact did,
his endeavour can be rendered as a correction of the simplifications which he
found in positions like the SDP, by changing the run of the argument according to his own methods. This can be seen from the beginning of the Theologia
‘Summi Boni’:
The incarnate wisdom of God, Christ the Lord, in describing the perfection of the
Highest Good, which is God, carefully distinguished it with three names when he
called the one and single, totally undivided and simple divine substance Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit, for three reasons. … To call God three persons, that is Father and Son
and Holy Spirit, amounts to saying that the divine substance is potent, wise, benign, or
23
24
25
Abaelardus Historia calamitatum, pp. 64, 31–67, 154).
Cf. Anselmus epistola 136, p. 279, 3–8; Niggli 1991, p. 271, note on 177, 10.
Abaelardus, Historia calamitatum, pp. 68, 164–69, 221.
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Matthias Perkams
again that it is potency itself26, wisdom itself, benignity itself. But in those three,
potency, wisdom, benignity, consists all the perfection of the good.27
Rather schematically, one can summarize Abelard’s argument as follows: he
starts from the signification of the word summum bonum (this notion is mentioned in the SDP shortly before the passage quoted28). From this signification
he draws conclusions regarding the implications of this notion: a summum
bonum which is about to create something has to be mighty, so it has to have
potentia; it has to be wise, so it must have sapientia; and it has to be good, so it
has to have benignitas or bonitas. Abelard explains the Trinity by the same triad
of concepts relevant to creation, as was already used in the SDP; but his
account is far more sophisticated: he has not to recur to human reason for the
invention of these concepts, but he can ascribe them to an authority, the
words of Christ. So he can present the doctrine of the Trinity in a way which is
both rationally or scientifically sound (according to the standards of the time,
of course) and not based on an obvious rationalism, but presented as a clarification of the tradition.
While Abelard took over the tendency of the SDP to explain the Trinity by a
rational analysis of the creator, he could borrow from William the term potentia to designate God the Father who lacks an own name in the SDP. It was not
difficult for him to introduce this term into the discussion of the Trinity. In
fact, the use of potentia in this context is the most original point in Abelard’s
and Hugh’s Trinitarian explanation both because of the newness and because
of the special signification of this word in Abelard’s work.29 Abelard could
have been moved to do so also from Boethius, who writes in his Consolatio
philosophiae that man lives in a world where often the virtues are trodden
underfoot, and states that this is hard to bear in the reign of an omnipotent,
omniscient and benevolent God.30 In this text which the logician Abelard
26
27
28
29
30
The translation of the Latin potentia in Abelard’s Trinitarian doctrine is difficult, because
Abelard unifies in this term the idea of God’s power and the Aristotelian notion of
dýnamis, which could be rendered as “possibility”. The term potency tries to give a compromise, which allows to discern both senses of the Abelardian term; with the same aim I
will use in my forthcoming German translation of the Theologia ‘Scholarium’ the word
“Mächtigkeit”.
“Summi boni perfectionem quod deus est, ipsa dei sapientia incarnata Christus dominus
describendo tribus nominibus diligenter distinxit, cum unicam et singularem, individuam penitus ac simplicem substantiam divinam patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum
tribus de causis appellaverit. … Tale est ergo deum esse tres personas, hoc est patrem et
filium et spiritum sanctum, ac si dicamus divinam substantiam esse potentem, sapientem
benignam, immo etiam esse ipsam potentiam, ipsam sapientiam, ipsam benignitatem. In
his autem tribus, potentia scilicet, sapientia, benignitate, tota boni perfectio consistit”.
(Tsum 1, 1–3, pp. 86, 4–8. 87, 21–26).
Sententiae divinae paginae 2, p. 6.
I discussed Abelard’s concept of potency in Perkams 2003, pp. 101–107.
“Quae fieri in regno scientis omnia, potentis omnia, sed bona tantummodo volentis Dei
nemo satis potest nec ammirari nec conqueri”. (Boethius consolatio 4, 1, 5 (CChr.SL 94),
p. 65, 15–17).
The origins of the Trinitarian attributes potentia, sapientia, benignitas
29
probably knew quite early in his career31 we find all the three elements which
Abelard adduces, and it should be pointed out that they appear in a discussion
of the unlimited goodness of God. It is of course possible that Abelard knew
also the writings of Ambrose and Paschasius Radbertus quoted by Poirel,
which, however, show closer parallels with Hugh’s treatment of the question.32
How that may be, the evidence adduced up to now shows clearly enough that
it was no less possible for Abelard than for any of his contemporaries to introduce potentia, sapientia, benignitas into the Trinitarian discussion. As to whether
he or Hugh was earlier in doing so, we can only look out for traces of possible
mutual influences in the earliest texts in which they used the formula, i.e. in
Hugh’s De tribus diebus and in Abelard’s Theologia ‘Summi Boni’.
2. The De tribus diebus and the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’
Ralf Stammberger has shown that there are many parallels in Hugh’s and
Abelard’s theological writings, though the approaches of both authors are
quite different from each other. “Where Hugh presents an exegesis of nature
Abelard analyses the texts of Jews and Gentiles.”33 Now, I want draw the attention to some points of contact between the both of them which could hint at
an acquaintance of Hugh with the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’ already at the time of
writing the De tribus diebus.
The most obvious parallel between the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’ and the De
tribus diebus, is the triad potentia, sapientia, benignitas itself. This parallel is
remarkable, because only one of the three notions is an uncontroversial part
of the tradition, as to say sapientia, which can be found already in Augustine as
part of triads describing the Trinity. Potentia is more difficult, but it could be
found in Paschasius or Ambrose and was used already by William of Champeaux in Trinitarian theology. Benignitas is another remarkable term: while
bonitas, caritas or voluntas are frequent attributes of the Holy Spirit in the
theological tradition, benignitas is, as far as I know, never used as an attribute
of the Holy Spirit before Abelard and Hugh34. While its equivalents do not
disappear totally, benignitas is clearly the prefered attribute of the Holy Spirit
in Abelard and in the De tribus diebus. This fact requires an explanation: which
considerations could have led Abelard or Hugh to use benignitas in spite of
bonitas?
According to the Index scriptorum of CChr.CM 13 Abelard cited the Consolatio three times
in Tsum and still more often in the subsequent versions of the Theologia.
32 Poirel 2002, pp. 348–356.
33 Stammberger 2002, pp. 69–76 (quotation: pp. 72f.).
34 Poirel 2002, p. 348 hints at Sap. 1, 6 (Benignus est enim spiritus sapientiae) and Gal. 5,
22 (Fructus spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pasx, patientia, benignitas …) as scriptural
testimonies for benignitas, but he does not cite authorities using this notion in a Trinitarian context. On Augustine he writes (358) “amor, voluntas ou benignitas sont pareillement appropriées au Fils et au Saint-Esprit”, but without citing a passage where benignitas
is used.
31
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Matthias Perkams
In the case of Abelard, this is not difficult to see: he needs a concept to
describe his concept of charity, which is, according to him, a good will directed towards the other creatures without any interest of his own.35 Bonitas is
problematic in this respect, because it could be understood as describing the
everlasting and immutable goodness of God, but benignitas serves Abelard’s
purpose very well. It has also a corresponding adjective, benignus, by the help
of which Abelard can describe the character of the Holy Spirit.36 On the other
hand, this term does not have a special function in Hugh, who does not
explain in the De tribus diebus, what benignitas means, and uses the adjective
benignus only in few cases. It seems that benignity is a term coined by Abelard
to serve his special purposes.
There are some parallels between Hugh and Abelard, as regards the function of the triadic formula: according to both authors, its cognition has a
moral effect. For example, Hugh writes at the end of the second part of his
treatise:
Consequently, he shows to you in his work how much he is able to do concerning your
redemption. … Nobody can resist him, because he is omnipotent; nobody can deceive
him, because he is the wisest; nobody can corrupt him, because he is the best.37
These formulations are very close to what Abelard says at the beginning of
the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’:
(Christ called) the Father according to the unique potency of his majesty which is
omnipotence, because nothing can resist him; but he called the same divine substance
the Son according to the acumen of his own wisdom by which he can judge without
being mistaken and understand everything, such that nothing can be hidden to him
by which he would be deceived; also he called him Holy Spirit according to the grace
of his benignity by which God prepares evil to nobody, but is ready to redeem all.38
It is obvious that at least the omnipotence and the wisdom of God have the
same significance in both authors and are described by almost identical formulations. The statements on benignitas are similar, too, though Hugh does
not adhere to Abelard’s pneumatology and, consequently, does not ascribe a
special sense to the word benignitas. We can follow up these parallels further. A
few lines later Hugh writes:
Cf. Tsum 3, 88f., pp. 195, 1195–196, 1202. 196, 1212–1219.
Tsum 1, 1–4, p. 13, 86–88.
“Monstrat ergo tibi in suo opere, quantum possit in tua redemptione. … Nemo resistere
ei potest, quia omnipotens est; nemo fallere eum potest, quia sapientissimus est; nemo
eum corrumpere potest, quia optimus est“. (Hugo trib. dieb. 24, p. 60, 1063–1067).
38 “Patrem quidem secundum illam unicam maiestatis sue potentiam, que est omnipotentia, qua scilicet efficere potest quicquid vult, cum nichil ei resistere queat; filium autem
eandem divinam substantiam dixit secundum proprie sapientie discretionem, qua videlicet cuncta veraciter diiudicare ac discernere potest, ut nichil eam latere possit quo
decipiatur; spiritum sanctum etiam vocavit ipsam secundum benignitatis sue gratiam,
qua scilicet nulli malum machinatur deus, sed paratus est cunctos salvare”. (Tsum 1, 1,
pp. 86, 11–p. 87, 18; this passage is situated between the two quoted above, n. 49).
35
36
37
The origins of the Trinitarian attributes potentia, sapientia, benignitas
31
When the recognized omnipotence of God excites our heart to admiration, this is the
day of the Father; but when the wisdom of God illuminates our heart, because we have
got cognition of the truth, this is the day of the Son; but when the hope of the
benignity of God inflames our heart to love, this is the day of the Holy Spirit. … In the
day of potency we die from fear; in the day of wisdom we get buried by the contemplation of the truth; in the day of benignity we arise through the love and the desire of
the eternal goods.39
The same connections between potency and fear and between benignity
and love we find also at the beginning of the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’:
There are two things which make us completely subject to God, these are fear and
love. Potency and wisdom instil especially fear, because we recognize that God is able
to punish faults and that nothing is hidden to him. But his benignity is related to love,
such that we love most intensely whom we see to be the most benign.40
There are some obvious parallels between both works also in these passages,
while some differences remain: Abelard wants to distinguish sharply between
fear and love which are the two modes of human piety; he understands love as
a decision of someone’s own will while fear is an obedience which is not
chosen freely.41 Hugh, on the other hand, compares the human behavior
towards God to three different days, each of which has certain properties
related to the invisible attributes of God. By doing so, Hugh creates the triad
of timor, veritas and amor, carrying on the triadic way of thought which is
predominant in the De tribus diebus. In the same way, he relates the triad of
potentia, sapientia, benignitas to the resurrection of Christ which is of no interest
to Abelard in this context.
These parallels show that Abelard and Hugh took part in the same theological debate (which is in any case very plausible, because both lived at the
same time in the same city, Paris) and that they without doubt influenced each
other. In some way, both of their treatises have the same goal, that is to make
God’s nature and its Trinity comprehensible by the help of the attributes
potentia, sapientia, benignitas which are themselves concepts of human reason.
Though Hugh does not relate this triad to the Trinity at the beginning of his
work, he does so at the end, leading the reader towards the same point which
Abelard makes at the very beginning of his own treatise.
“Quando ergo omnipotentia Dei considerata in admirationem cor nostrum excitat, dies
Patris est; quando vero sapientia Dei inspecta agnitione veritatis cor nostrum illuminat,
dies Filii est; quando autem benignitas Dei attenta ad amorem cor nostrum inflammat,
dies Spiritus sancti est. … In die potentiae per timorem morimur; in die sapientiae per
contemplationem veritatis a strepitu huius mundi sepelimur; in die benignitatis per
amorem et desiderium aeternorum bonorum resurgimus“. (Hugo trib. dieb., p. 69,
1237–1245; cf. also ibid., pp. 63, 1126–p. 64, 1131).
40 “Duo quippe sunt que nos omnino Deo subiectos efficiunt, timor videlicet atque amor.
Potentia quidem et sapientia maxime timorem incutiunt, cum eum et posse punire
errata et nichil latere cognocimus. Benignitas autem eius ad amorem pertinet, ut quam
benignissimum habemus, potissimum diligamus“. (Abaelardus Tsum 1, 4, p. 88, 41–46).
41 Perkams 2001a.
39
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Matthias Perkams
But what does all this mean to our main question: did Abelard borrow the
triadic formula from Hugh or the other way around? Or did both of them rely
on the same oral or written sources? What makes answering these questions so
difficult is, that both of them were so outstanding theologians: each reworked
the material which he had at his disposal according to his own ideas. Neither
of them quotes the other, and it is very improbable that either would have
done so, had he used the other’s work.42 So, it is equally conceivable that
Abelard borrowed some concepts from Hugh and adapted them to his own
interests and that Hugh read the introduction to the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’
before writing a treatise in which some of its ideas are reproduced in a different theological framework.
Having said so much, I think that we have good reasons to suppose that
Hugh drew on Abelard: 1) Abelard’s Theologia ‘Summi Boni’ is closely related to
the theological project of his teacher William of Champeaux. There are no
such parallels between Hugh and William, but only between Hugh and Abelard. The easiest way to explain this is that Hugh used Abelard’s work as a
starting point for his own reflections. 2) A second argument is the significance
of the triad in Abelard: potentia and benignitas are key concepts which he needs
to develop his explanation of the Trinity with the help of ethical presuppositions. Without the ambivalent potentia he cannot link Trinitarian theology to
the exegesis of Aristotle, as I have shown elsewhere43. Benignitas is crucial to
him for ascribing to God his concept of Charity. There is no similar relevance
of these terms in Hugh’s theological framework. 3) Around 1120 Abelard was
already a famous master whose ideas were without doubt widely read and
discussed. In this perspective it would be more natural that the young Hugh
read the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’ and picked up a few ideas from it than that
Abelard used key concepts of the first major work of the young Hugh to shape
his Theology.
3. Poirel’s arguments in favor of Hugh
So, there are some reasons to think that Abelard was the first one to apply
the complete triad of potentia, sapientia, benignitas to Trinitarian theology.
However, Poirel puts forward some arguments in the opposite direction,
which deserve to be discussed shortly.
The first point is the dating of the De tribus diebus itself. Poirel, criticizing
Damien van den Eynde,44 makes a new attempt to date the De tribus diebus.45
The only sure date he supplies for this treatise is a hint which the author gives
in his Libellus de formatione arche, an appendix to the larger De archa Noe, which
must have been completed in 1126/27. Because one has to reckon with a span
of time between this work and the De tribus diebus, according to Poirel the
42
43
44
45
Cf. Poirel 2002, p. 169.
Cf. Perkams 2003.
van den Eynde 1960.
Poirel 2002, pp. 131–150.
The origins of the Trinitarian attributes potentia, sapientia, benignitas
33
terminus ante quem of the latter is 1125/26.46 This date is some years after the
terminus ante quem which one can establish for the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’: one
can date this work with certainty to the time around 1120 or still earlier, as it
must have been completed by March 1121, when it was condemned at the
Council of Soissons. If we allow some time for the discussions which led to this
assembly, keeping in mind also that Abelard had time to enlarge his treatise at
least once, probably before Soissons, it seems likely that he composed the first
version, which already contains the Trinitarian terminology, not later than
1119.47 On the other hand, we do not have a precise terminus post quem for the
De tribus diebus, so that it could theoretically have been completed before
Abelard’s work. This is what Poirel tries to prove: his assumption that the
formula potentia, sapientia, benignitas is presupposed in Abelard’s treatise is his
crucial argument for dating the De tribus diebus to the time before the Theologia
‘Summi Boni’ was composed. If this is true and if Hugh arrived at Paris, as far as
we know, between 1115–111848 the time in which the De tribus diebus could
have been composed must be the span between 1115/18–112049. However, the
dating of the treatise is completely dependent on the priority of Hugh in
coining the Trinitarian formula. Which arguments does Poirel give for this
assumption?
His first point is the development in the use of potentia, sapientia, benignitas
in Hugh’s treatise: the triad is applied to the Trinity not from the very beginning of the work, but only towards the end.50 Hugh’s aim is to understand the
Creator by attributes which can be deduced from creation, while a Trinitarian
perspective is not the main goal of the De tribus diebus.51 Abelard, on the other
hand, starts with the three concepts as Trinitarian attributes.52 According to
Poirel, we can conclude from this that he knew the development of Hugh’s
thought within the De tribus diebus.53 However, we have seen that Abelard probably knew the Trinitarian connotations of the three concepts already from
William of Champeaux and, consequently, had not to rely on Hugh for their
invention.54
Furthermore, Poirel hints at the fact that the triad potentia, sapientia, benignitas is used also by Bernard of Clairvaux who is in this regard dependent on
the De tribus diebus.55 He concludes from this “on voit mal saint Bernard atta46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
Poirel 2002, p.pp. 150f.
We also know that Roscelin of Compiègne wrote a letter to bishop Gilbert of Paris against
the Tsum, to which an answer by Abelard still exists. Both letters have to be dated between the publication of the Tsum and the Council of Soissons. Mews 1987, pp. 54f. An
enlargement to the Tsum by Abelard himself is witnessed by ms. B (Berlin, Staatsbibl.
Preuß. Kulturbesitz theol. lat. oct. 95):. cf. Mews, 1987, pp. 67f.
Poirel 2002, p. 152, following Taylor 1957, p. 67.
Poirel 2002, pp. 150–152.
Hugo trib. dieb., p. 64, 1131f.
Poirel 2002, pp. 249–258. 318–327.
Tsum 1, 1–5, pp. 86, 4–p. 88, 62.
Poirel 2002, pp. 376–378.
See above p. ?.
Poirel 2002, pp. 177–181.
34
Matthias Perkams
quer Abélard pour hérésie et lui emprunter dans le même temps un de ses
thèmes les plus litigieux. Une telle attitude nuancée ne s’explique que si la
triade avait aux yeux de l’abbé de Clairvaux une origine plus respectable et
plus ’“autorisée” qu’Abélard”’.56 However, Poirel himself cites no passage of
Bernard in which the three notions are used as Trinitarian attributes, which is
the only novelty introduced around 1120. His argument, then, is not conclusive: on the one hand, there is no reason to suspect that Bernard refuted every
teaching of Abelard only because it was the invention of the Parisian master;
this holds especially true for Bernard’s works which are written before the
synod of Sens in 1141, as is Bernard’s 6th sermon on the Cantique from
1135/36 where he uses the triad for the first time.57 Secondly, the triad potentia, sapientia, benignitas itself was not controversial between Abelard and his
adversaries. Crucial is the role of these notions as divine attributes and especially the relationship between the omnipotence of the Father and the lesser
omnipotence Abelard seems to ascribe to the Son. So, there was nothing that
should have prevented Bernard from using this triad without touching the
Trinitarian question at all. Furthermore, we cannot be sure that Bernard knew
of Abelard’s use of the triad while he borrowed it from the De tribus diebus.
There is no reason to assume that he was specially informed or peculiarly
interested in the origin of this formula.
The last argument proposed by Poirel draws on the content of Abelard’s
work: «On comprend mal pourquoi le maı̂tre breton aurait, de son propre
chef, inventé la triade potentia, sapientia, benignitas ainsi que son emploi trinitaire».58 Abelard would be concerned with the texts of the theological tradition
and would not intend to present innovations. This argument is crucial, for two
reasons: on the one hand, Abelard is quite able and eager to invent and
develop new arguments if they suit his purposes; his use of sources is heavily
determined by his own preoccupations.59 On the other hand, as I have
shown,60 the triad potentia, sapientia, benignitas fits very well into Abelard’s way
of doing theology. It allows him to explain the Trinity as summum bonum with
the help of certain words as they are commonly understood, and it gives an
ideal basis for a theology, which has close links to ethical questions. Though
Abelard develops his ethical ideas for the most part after the Theologia ‘Summi
Boni’, it is quite probable that he was interested in these questions already
before 1120.61 So, he had good reasons and was able to coin the triadic formula, if he had its single elements at his disposal, as has been shown above.
56
57
58
59
60
61
Poirel 2002, p. 373.
Bernardus Sermo in Cant. 6, 3, in Opera, i, p. 27. For the date cf. Köpf 1994, p. 32. For the
date of the synod of Sens which until recently has been situated in 1140, cf. now Mews
2002.
Poirel 2002, p. 379.
I studied this point regarding Abelard’s use of Cicero in Perkams 2001b.
Cf. above p. ?.
A large portion of it is already present in Abelard’s Theologia christiana, composed not
long after 1121; Perkams 2001a, 31–54. In this article, I cite only the Tsum, while paying
no attention to the development of Abelard’s thought in the later versions of his Theologia.
The origins of the Trinitarian attributes potentia, sapientia, benignitas
35
4. Conclusion
In sum, it is still plausible to ascribe to Abelard the introduction of potentia,
sapientia, benignitas into Trinitarian theology. What we know about the chronology of the respective works speaks more in favour of this hypothesis: there
is no proof that the De tribus diebus is earlier than the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’.
The terminus ante quem of Hugh’s treatise remains 1125/26. Perhaps he wrote
it as to give a really theological treatment of the rational comprehensibility of
God’s nature, a popular theme in those days whose treatment through Abelard, however, could have seemed to Hugh too dialectical.62
More important is a second point: a composition of the triad by Abelard is
quite possible. Firstly, it can easily be understood as a resolution of problems
which emerged in the schools where he learned. This way of looking for new
solutions to old problems by his own experience as a logician fits very well with
Abelard’s overall way of thinking, while it is hard to conceive that he borrowed
his ideas from Hugh’s treatise which was so alien to his own interests. A second
point is that the triad potentia, sapientia, benignitas suits Abelard’s theological
project especially well, because he relies heavily on the ambivalence of potentia
and by benignitas he can clarify his own theory of God’s Charity.
In spite of these reasons one should reflect, given the difficulty of the question, on another idea on the development of the origin of this triad, namely
that it was produced in oral discussions, based on Patristic teaching at the
school of William of Champeaux in Paris.63 This idea seems to be attractive
because it can help to explain the surprising fact that Abelard and Hugh begin
to use potentia, sapientia, benignitas as key concepts in their theological works at
nearly exactly the same time. But even this assumption is not without problems: it is hard to see how the triad could have been already the subject of
discussions which started much earlier than around 1117/18, the year in
which Abelard probably began to work at the Theologia ‘Summi Boni’, because
there is no evidence for this in the many sentences which we still have from
these discussions. The testimonies of the Sententiae of William of Champeaux
and of the SDP show that the triad reflects earlier theological discussions, but
they show also that these discussions did not yet use this formula as attributes
of the Trinitarian persons. Therefore, if one accepts the thesis that the triad is
a product of oral discussions, those discussions must have been nearly contemporary with our first written records of the triad, and very probably the two
first important users of this formula, Abelard and Hugh, were themselves
involved in them. Given this fact and the arguments adduced above, I do not
see how we could ascribe the Trinitarian formula to anyone else than Peter
Abelard, and I think that it is, also after Poirel, still correct to call it the
“Abelardian triad”.
Cf. Hugh’s reserve against the dialectica Hugo sap. an., 845f., a passage which could
according to Stammberger 2002, p. 78, concern Abelard.
63 Cf. This is the position of Ralf Stammberger and Constant Mews; cf. Stammberger 2002,
p. 72 with n. 40.
62
36
Matthias Perkams
Appendix: The triad and the interpretation of the Timaeus
There is one loose end in the picture which I have presented. John Whittaker
has pointed out, that the triad is used in 12th century-commentaries on Plato’s
Timaeus to explain Tim. 30A 2–6, a passage, in which already Proclus found
the potency, wisdom, and goodness of the creator. One might conclude from
this that the 12th-century theologians knew the triad from some interpretation
of the Timaeus. As far as Abelard is concerned, it is not very probable that he
took the triad from an ancient interpretation of the Timaeus: he quotes the
relevant passage of Plato’s work for the first time in the Theologia christiana,
which has been written some years after the Theologia ‘Summi boni’. Even then,
he is not convinced that Plato’s text can be reconciled with Christian doctrine;
he is irritated by the phrase that God created everything as good “as the
nature of the things, which come into existence, permits” (prout eorum quae
nascuntur natura fert), because this seems to impose a limit on God’s omnipotence.64 These words, however, are not in Plato, but they are Calcidius’
rendering of the Greek καταÁ δυ ναµιν.65 This is important for our question,
because it was just this expression, which allowed Proclus, with “a little force”66,
to find the potency of the creator in that passage67. Abelard, then, did not
have at his disposal a text of Plato, in which the complete triad could be
found. This problem must have concerned all 12th century-readers of the Timaeus. It is not surprising, that William of Conches in his Glosae in Platonem,
which has been written probably after 1140, Jeauneau 1965, 14f. does not find
the triad in Timaeus 30a, but mentions only essentia, sapientia, bonitas to explain
Aristotle’s efficient, formal and final causes Guillelmus de Conches glosae 98;
quoted by Whittaker 1987, 287.; in fact, he knows also the term potentia, but
he connects it only with sapientia, not with bonitas.68 As far as Abelard is concerned, the fact that he links the triad potentia, sapientia, bonitas with Plato’s
text in his Commentary on the Letter to the Romans,69 seems to be a secondary
connection of his Trinitarian theology and his teaching on God’s omnipotence. It seems, then, that the emergence of our triad in 12th-centuryPlatonism does not depend on a direct transmission of ancient sources; at
least, I am not able to clarify at the moment, “by what route this interpretation of Timaeus 30 A-B … found its way to the Platonists of the twelfth century”,70 though further research on the history of Platonism might change this
picture.
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
Abaelardus Theologia christiana 5, 34–36, pp. 361, 488–363, 511.
Plato Timaeus 30A 3; Calcidius translatio 22, 23 Waszink.
Whittaker 1987, 283.
Proclus in Timaeum 1, 374, 30–375, 5; 381, 1–5; Whittaker 1987, 282f.
Guillelmus de Conches glosae 112. 118.
Abaelardus Expositio 1, p. 69, 767–776).
Whittaker 1987, 287.
The origins of the Trinitarian attributes potentia, sapientia, benignitas
37
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